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I. INTRODUCTION
Elvia Garcia “smelled strong odors of something decaying” coming from the
electrical outlets of her Arvin, California home.1 She and her family “thought there
was something in between the walls that had died.”2 Government inspectors found
toxic gas leaking from an underground pipe 225 feet away from homes in Garcia’s
neighborhood.3 The Kern County Fire Department gave her family only one hour
to evacuate.4 Garcia would need to wait nine months before it was safe for her
family to live in their home again.5 High levels of toxic chemicals in the air and
soil prevented their return.6
As demonstrated by the Arvin gas pipe leak, living near oil and gas production
facilities has dangerous and unintended consequences. 7 Oil and gas extraction

1. Mark Olalde & Ryan Menezes, The Toxic Legacy of Old Oil Wells: California’s Multibillion-Dollar
Problem, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/projects/california-oil-well-drilling-idle-cleanup/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. See id. (reporting that government inspectors drilled test holes and discovered explosive levels of gas);
see also Henry A. Barrios, For Arvin Evacuees, There’s No Place Like Home, BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN (June
14,
2014),
https://www.bakersfield.com/archives/for-arvin-evacuees-there-s-no-place-likehome/article_94065ad6-75a6-567f-bee3-17f494c4764d.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (describing that the natural gas pipeline was underground and 225 feet away from the nearest home). See
generally Rebekah Kearn, Kern Families Sue Petro over Toxic Gas Leak, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Mar. 14,
2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/kern-families-sue-petro-over-toxic-gas-leak/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that eight families evacuated their homes from approximately
March 2014 until December 2014 due to high levels of explosive gas).
4. Telephone Interview with Jose Gurrola, Mayor of Arvin, California (July 23, 2020) [hereinafter Gurrola
Interview] (notes on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. See Olalde & Menezes, supra note 1 (indicating Elvia Garcia had to wait nine months before she returned
to her home in Arvin).
6. See Barrios, supra note 3 (reporting that Kern County released air and soil sample results that found
high levels of benzene and naphthalene).
7. See Olalde & Menezes, supra note 1 (recounting Elvia Garcia’s experience evacuating after the
dangerous Arvin gas pipe leak).
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poisons the air and water, and it poses a serious threat to public health. 8 Hydraulic
fracking—a new drilling technique—enabled oil and gas operators to move fossils
fuels closer and closer to people’s backyards.9 Oil and gas production
disproportionally takes place near communities of color. 10 AB 345 sought to
protect these frontline communities by establishing statewide setback distances
between oil and gas wells and sensitive land uses, such as homes, schools, and
hospitals.11
Oil and gas corporations prey on minority communities to operate because
those communities frequently have fewer financial and political resources to
successfully resist fossil fuel production.12 The industry’s persistent and
unrestricted placement of oil and gas wells near minority communities is
environmental racism and perpetuates public health inequities. 13AB 345’s
opponents argued that setback distance laws are unconstitutional regulatory
takings that deprive oil and gas operators of the right to profit from their property.14
While takings claims were unlikely to be successful, their aim was to discourage
governments from adopting buffer zones.15 AB 345 would have standardized
setback laws and guided California’s regulatory agencies to prioritize health and
safety.16 Adopting AB 345 was a necessary step to protect public health,

8. LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, CALIFORNIA OIL AND GAS POLICY BRIEF: OUR LAST CHANCE, PHASING OUT
FOSSIL FUELS 12 (2019), available at https://lastchancealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/California-Oiland-Gas-Policy-Brief-Last-Chance-Alliance.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
9. See Kevin J. Lynch, Regulation of Fracking Is Not a Taking of Private Property, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 39,
42 (2018) (indicating that hydraulic fracking is a new drilling technique that allows operators to extract from
reserves that were previously inaccessible and increasingly encroach upon densely populated urban and suburban
areas).
10. See TANJA SREBOTNJAK & MIRIAM ROTKIN-ELLMAN, NRDC, DRILLING IN CALIFORNIA: WHO’S AT
RISK? 4 (2014), available at https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/california-fracking-risks-report.pdf (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“In total, people of color make up nearly 92 percent of the 1.8
million people living within a mile of oil and gas development and in communities already heavily burdened by
pollution.”).
11. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
12. See JAY WITHGOTT & MATTHEW LAPOSATA, ENVIRONMENT: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE STORIES 138
(6th ed. 2018) (explaining that low-income minority communities are exposed to a greater share of environmental
pollution because they often have less access to information on environmental health risks, less political power
to influence politicians to protect their interests, and fewer financial resources to mitigate pollution risks).
13. Compare SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 9 (indicating that approximately 5.4
million people live within a mile of one or more oil and gas wells, which is roughly to 1 in 5 African Americans,
1 in 6 Hispanic/Latinos, 1 in 7 Asians, and 1 in 9 Whites) with Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding
Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839, 840 (1992) (“[W]hen we label an environmental practice as an
example of environmental racism we are saying that the predictable distributional impact of that decision
contributes to the structure of racial subordination and domination that has similarly marked many of our public
policies in this country.”).
14. See Lynch, supra note 9 (describing how the oil and gas industry retaliates against fracking regulation
by threatening to file takings claims).
15. See id. at 42–43 (2018) (explaining that takings claims based on fracking are unlikely to succeed
because of the government’s overriding interest in protecting health and safety and the environment).
16. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
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particularly for minority communities living near oil and gas development.17
However, given AB 345’s demise in the legislature, California should adopt
setback distances through the California Geologic Energy Management Division
(“CalGEM”) and the rulemaking process. 18
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
CalGEM is housed within the Department of Conservation (“DOC”) and is the
primary agency overseeing California’s oil and gas industry.19 CalGEM—formerly
the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (“DOGGR”)—coordinates
with federal, state, and local agencies to monitor the state’s oil and gas
production.20
Section A discusses SB 4’s role in establishing California’s current multiagency regulatory framework for the oil and gas industry and funding the scientific
support for AB 345.21 Section B describes how AB 1057 renamed DOGGR to
CalGEM and transitioned CalGEM’s purpose to include public health.22 Section C
looks into California cities and counties that have already adopted setback distance
laws.23 Section D reviews California’s Administrative Procedures Act. 24 Section E
describes buffer zone regulations in Colorado, a state with similar oil production
levels that uses an agency-led approach to setback distances. 25 Section F explains
unconstitutional regulatory takings.26
A. SB 4 (Pavley 2013): Regulating and Information Gathering on Hydraulic
Fracking
SB 4 established DOGGR as the lead agency to monitor California’s oil and
gas production, with an enhanced focus on regulating hydraulic fracking. 27
17. Compare AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not
enacted) (showing AB 345 would have created setback distances between oil and gas wells and communities to
protect public health), with SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4 (indicating that minority
communities are disproportionally more likely to live near oil and gas activity).
18. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11346.2 (West 2020).
19. See generally About Us, CAL. DEP’T CONSERVATION, https://www.conservation.ca.gov/about-us (last
visited Aug. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing CalGEM’s role within
the Department of Conservation in regulating oil and natural gas).
20. See ETHAN N. ELKIND & TED LAMM, BERKELEY CTR. FOR LAW, ENERGY AND THE ENV’T, LEGAL
GROUNDS LAW AND POLICY OPTIONS TO FACILITATE A PHASE-OUT OF FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION IN
CALIFORNIA 5 (2020) (listing the federal, state, and local agencies that regulate the oil and gas industry).
21. Infra Section II.A.
22. Infra Section II.B.
23. Infra Section II.C.
24. Infra Section II.D.
25. Infra Section II.E.
26. Infra Section II.F.
27. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3160 (West 2020).
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Previously, California did not have a specific regulatory program that monitored
hydraulic fracking, a new and increasingly popular extraction technology.28 SB 4
directed DOGGR to establish a separate and enhanced permitting and disclosure
process for hydraulic fracking.29
In addition, SB 4 required a scientific study on hydraulic fracking’s
environmental and public health impacts.30 The research that resulted laid the
foundation for AB 345’s setback distances. 31 Researchers concluded the most
significant exposure to toxic air contaminants occur within approximately 2,500
feet from active oil and gas activity.32 Researchers recommended setback distance
laws for all oil and gas wells.33 However, the distance would depend on a number
of factors, including the nature of the “sensitive receptors.” 34 Sensitive receptors
are land uses where populations are more susceptible to pollution.35 Homes,
schools, and hospitals are examples of sensitive receptors.36
B. AB 1057 (Limon 2019): A Change in Direction for the DOGGR
AB 1057 renamed DOGGR to CalGEM and directed it to adopt regulations
that not only monitor the oil and gas industry, but also specifically protect public
health.37 Prior to AB 1057, DOGGR primarily focused on oil and gas

28. See Phillip M. Bender, California Creates New Regulatory Regime for “Fracking,” A.B.A. (Nov. 1,
2013),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/201314/november-december-2013/california_creates_new_regulatory_regime_fracking/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2020)
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing California’s lack of oversight over hydraulic
fracking).
29. ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 17.
30. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3160 (West 2020) (indicating that the study needed to “evaluate the hazards
and risks and potential hazards and risks that well stimulation treatments pose to natural resources and public,
occupational, and environmental health and safety”).
31. Assembly Floor, Floor Analysis of AB 345, at 2 (Jan. 27, 2020).
32. See JANE C.S. LONG ET AL., CAL. COUNCIL ON SCI. & TECH., AN INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT OF WELL STIMULATION IN CALIFORNIA VOLUME II 45 (2015), available at https://ccst.us/wpcontent/uploads/160708-sb4-vol-II-7.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The most
significant exposures to toxic air contaminants such as benzene, aliphatic hydrocarbons and hydrogen sulfide
occur within 800 m [approximately 2,500 feet] from active oil and gas development”).
33. See id. at 431 (“The need for setbacks applies to all oil and gas wells, not just those that are
stimulated.”).
34. See id. (“The distance of a setback would depend on factors such as the presence of sensitive receptors,
such as schools, daycare centers, and residential elderly care facilities”).
35.
See
What
are
Sensitive
Receptors?,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
https://www3.epa.gov/region1/eco/uep/sensitivereceptors.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Sensitive receptors include, but are not limited to, hospitals, schools,
daycare facilities, elderly housing and convalescent facilities. These are areas where the occupants are more
susceptible to the adverse effects of exposure to toxic chemicals, pesticides, and other pollutants.”).
36. Id.
37. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3002 (West 2020) (showing AB 1057 amended “Division” to refer to the
California Geologic Energy Management Division in the California Department of Conservation); PUB. RES. §
3011 (“[To protect] public health and safety and environmental quality . . . in a manner that meets the energy
needs of the state.”).
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development.38 By enhancing CalGEM’s role in promoting health and safety, AB
1057 led the way for AB 345’s setback distance regulations. 39
C. Local Setback Ordinances in California
Several cities and counties in California already adopted buffer zone laws that
establish distances between oil and gas production and sensitive land uses. 40 Local
governments use their police power to restrict the location of oil and gas production
through zoning law.41 The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that states have the police power to enact laws that protect the public’s
safety, health, and welfare. 42 States then grant authority to counties and cities to
enact measures that protect the community.43 If state laws and local laws conflict,
state laws generally void local laws through preemption.44
A number of city governments in California have adopted buffer zone laws
that vary between 200 feet and 750 feet. 45 For example, the City of Signal Hill
prohibits oil and gas wells 200 feet from parks and 300 feet from schools, hospitals,
and places of public gathering.46 The City of Arvin adopted a setback distance of
38. See PUB. RES. § 3106 (“[S]upervise the drilling, operation, maintenance, and abandonment of wells so
as to permit the owners or operators of the wells to utilize all methods and practices known to the oil industry for
the purpose of increasing the ultimate recovery of underground hydrocarbons . . . .”).
39. PUB. RES. § 3011.
40. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 30 (listing several cities that already have setback distances,
including Arvin, Carson, Huntington Beach, Long Beach, and Signal Hill).
41. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 30 n.185 (demonstrating that limiting oil and gas development
within a city is a reasonable use of police power); see also Letter from Xavier Becerra, California Att’y Gen., to
Mayor, City Councilmembers and Planning Comm’n Members, City of Arvin (June 8, 2018) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 552, 558
(1953): A city has “the unquestioned right to regulate the business of operating oil wells within its city limits, and
to prohibit their operation within delineated areas and districts, if reason appears for so doing”).
42. See U.S. CONST. amend X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); Police Powers, CORNELL
L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/police_powers (last visited Aug. 8, 2020) (on file with the University
of the Pacific) (explaining that the Tenth Amendment reserves the rights of local governments “to make all
necessary laws” that protect the public’s safety, health, and welfare.’).
43. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police,
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”).
44. ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 30; see Preemption, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption (last visited Aug. 8, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (“The preemption doctrine refers to the idea that a higher authority of law will displace the law of a
lower authority of law when the two authorities come into conflict.”); INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, LOCAL AGENCY
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS (2012) (explaining that charter cities are less likely to be subject to state preemption
than non-charter cities when local laws conflict with state laws).
45. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 30 (listing several cities that have setback distance laws,
including Arvin, Carson, Huntington Beach, Long Beach, and Signal Hill).
46. See SIGNAL HILL, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 16.16 (1990) (showing Signal Hill’s sections 16.16.010
and 16.16.030 drilling standards: no new wells in residential zoning areas within the city and “[t]hree hundred
feet from any place of public assemblage, institution, hospital, or school” and “[t]wo hundred feet from any public
park”).
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300 feet from schools, hospitals, and homes.47 Further, the City of Carson has the
largest city setback distance at 750 feet between wells and homes, schools, and
hospitals.48
Several county governments have also established buffer zone laws. 49 Santa
Barbara County requires 200 feet between any oil well or tank and new buildings.50
Kern County established a buffer zone of 210 feet from homes, schools, hospitals,
and locations of public gathering.51 Ventura County adopted a setback distance of
1,500 feet from homes and 2,500 feet from schools.52
D. California Administrative Procedures Act
California’s agencies enact regulations using the rulemaking process through
the California Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). 53 Any person can petition
an agency to adopt a new regulation.54 Within 30 days, the agency must respond
to the petition.55 However, an agency can only adopt regulations within the scope
of its authority.56 When agencies are considering proposed regulations, the agency
must provide notice for public hearings.57
E. Colorado’s Agency-Driven Oil and Gas Setback Distance Laws
Colorado, a state with similar oil production as California, uses an agencydriven regulatory approach to restricting oil and gas production. 58 The Colorado
47. See ARVIN, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 17.46 (2018) (showing Arvin’s section 17.46.022: “[t]he
surface locations of wells and tanks within an oil and gas site [cannot be] located within [300 feet] . . . of public
school, public park, clinic, hospital, long-term health care facility”).
48. See CARSON, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE art. IX, ch. 5 (2016) (indicating that under Carson’s section 9521,
oil and gas wells cannot be within “(750) feet of the property boundaries of any public school, public park, clinic,
hospital, long-term health care facility” and “(750) feet of the property boundaries of any residence”).
49. See MARINE RESEARCH SPECIALISTS, WHITTIER MAIN OIL FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT REVISED
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
REPORT
app.
G
(2011),
available
at
https://www.cityofwhittier.org/home/showdocument?id=1380 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (summarizing local California setback ordinances by city and county).
50. See SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, CAL., CODE ch. 25 (2011) (showing section 25-21: “[n]o building shall
be erected within [200] feet of any well or tanks”).
51. See KERN COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE tit. 19, ch. 19.98 (2015) (indicating that under Kern
County’s section 19.98.060 oil and gas wells cannot be drilled within “(210) feet of any sensitive receptor (single
or multi-family dwelling unit, place of public assembly, institution, school or hospital)”).
52. Jonathan Ullman, Ventura County Supervisors Vote to Protect People from Oil & Gas Pollution,
SIERRA CLUB LOS PADRES CHAPTER (Sept. 16, 2020), available at https://www.sierraclub.org/lospadres/blog/2020/09/ventura-county-supervisors-vote-protect-people-oil-gas-pollution (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
53. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 11340–11361 (West 2020).
54. GOV’T § 11340.6.
55. GOV’T § 11340.7.
56. GOV’T § 11342.1.
57. GOV’T § 11346.4.
58. ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 19; see Monthly Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production, U.S.
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Oil & Gas Conservation Commission adopted setback distances of 350 feet from
parks, 500 feet from all occupied buildings, and 1,000 feet from high-occupancy
buildings.59 Schools, nursing facilities, and hospitals qualify as high-occupancy
buildings.60 Colorado’s statewide setback regulations do not preempt local city and
county regulations if they adopt larger setback distances. 61
F. Unconstitutional Regulatory Takings
Unconstitutional regulatory takings occur when a government adopts laws that
improperly limit a property owner’s economic use of their land.62 Under the United
States and California constitutions, if a court finds that a regulation resulted in an
unconstitutional taking, the government must pay just compensation.63 When
determining whether a regulation is a taking, courts consider the Lucas v. South
Carolina Coast Council test and the Pennsylvania Central Transportation v. City
of New York factors.64
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 31, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/production/ (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (showing graph demonstrating California and Colorado produced a similar amount of
crude oil since December 2017); see generally About the COGGC, COLORADO OIL & GAS CONSERVATION
COMMISSION, https://cogcc.state.co.us/about.html#/about (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review) (“The mission of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) is
to regulate the development and production of the natural resources of oil and gas in the state of Colorado in a
manner that protects public health, safety, welfare, the environment and wildlife resources.”).
59. ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 46.
60. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 46 (explaining that in Colorado, an operator can petition for
wells to be closer if they obtain waivers from nearby property owners, meet risk mitigation measures, or
demonstrate no other area is available to drill); Definitions, COLORADO OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION,
available at https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/Rules/2012/setback/Final_SetbackRules.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining high occupancy buildings as schools, hospitals, nursing facilities,
prisons, childcare centers).
61. SB 19-181 Protect Public Welfare Oil And Gas Operations, COLORADO GEN. ASSEMBLY, available at
https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb19181#:~:text=Section%2017%20amends%20preemption%20law,or%20stricter%20than%20state%20requiremen
ts (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing Colorado’s
SB-181 which “amends preemption law by specifying . . . that local government requirements may be . . . stricter
than state requirements”).
62. ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 31.
63. See U.S. CONST. amend V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”); CAL. CONST. art. I §19(a) (“Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only
when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner”);
see also ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 31 (explaining the United States and California Constitutions both
require just compensation for public takings of private property); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R.
COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 927–28 (4th ed. 2018) (explaining that the courts frequently
quantify just compensation by the property’s the fair market value).
64. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“[W]hen an owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses . . . he has suffered a taking.”); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (listing the Penn Central factors: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation’s interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(3) the character of the governmental action); ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 31 (explaining that in order to
establish an unconstitutional taking “a property owner must show that the rule deprives it of all economically
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Subsection 1 discusses how the courts use the Lucas test to determine if a
regulation is an unconstitutional total taking.65 Subsection 2 explains how the
courts use the Penn Central factors to determine when a regulation is an
unconstitutional partial taking.66 Subsection 3 discusses methods local
governments may use to phase out undesirable land uses and avoid
unconstitutional regulatory takings litigation.67
1. Total Takings and the Lucas Test
Under the Lucas test, when a court determines a regulation denies a property
owner all economic beneficial use of their property, a regulation is a total taking.68
The Lucas test is difficult to meet.69 For example, the court concluded in Palazzo
that a 94% reduction in a landowner’s property value did not constitute a total
taking.70 If the court determines that a regulation does completely deprive a
property of its value, the Lucas test permits the “background principles of nuisance
and property law” defense.71 To succeed under the defense, governments must
prove that a landowner’s current use of the land is already unlawful.72 Generally,
a background principles defense focuses on showing that the regulated land use
was a nuisance.73 However, other legal arguments based on other background
principles can succeed. 74

beneficial use of the property or otherwise imposes an unreasonable burden”).
65. Infra Subsection II.F.1.
66. Infra Subsection II.F.2.
67. Infra Subsection II.F.3.
68. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018; see SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 63, at 993 (explaining that Lucas
established the “categorical rule,” where any regulation that deprives a property completely of its value is a per
se taking, even if the public interest in adopting the regulation is high).
69. See Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 616, 630–31 (2001) (showing that a steep reduction in property
value from $3,150,000 to $200,000 was insufficient to prove that the property owner suffered total deprivation of
economically beneficial use under the Lucas test).
70. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616, 630–31.
71. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
72. See id. at 1029–30 (“Such regulatory action may . . . [eliminate] the land’s only economically
productive use, but it does not [prohibit] a productive use that was previously permissible under relevant property
and nuisance principles. The use of these properties for what are now expressly prohibited purposes was always
unlawful, and . . . it was open to the State at any point to make the implication of those background principles of
nuisance and property law explicit.”); Lynch, supra note 9, at 63 (explaining that “[i]f the government is able to
prove . . . a background principle could impose the same limit as the regulation” then the government does not
need to pay just compensation to the landowner).
73. See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 63, at 803 (explaining that when a land use is intentional,
nontrespassory, unreasonable, and substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land, the property owner
might be liable for nuisance).
74. See Lynch, supra note 9, at 63 (indicating that other background principles other than nuisance can
successfully defeat Lucas takings claims, such as Native American treaty rights and water rights restrictions).

395

2021 / California Oil and Gas Production Near Communities of Color is a Public
Health Crisis
2. Partial Takings and the Penn Central Factors
When a regulation does not completely eliminate the economic value of the
property, courts use the Penn Central factors to determine if the regulation is a
partial taking.75 The main Penn Central factors are: (1) the economic impact of
the regulation; (2) the regulation’s interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action. 76 Regulatory
takings cases require detailed factual findings and complex analyses. 77
3. Zoning Law and Nonconforming Use
To avoid unconstitutional takings claims, local governments may use zoning
laws and nonconforming uses to prohibit and phase-out undesirable land uses.78
Cities and counties pass ordinances that divide land and designate areas for specific
land uses.79 Zoning ordinances separate residential and commercial areas. 80
When governments pass zoning amendments that cause existing land uses to fall
out of compliance with current regulations, those properties become
nonconforming uses.81 Although nonconforming uses violate current zoning laws,
they may continue to operate because they were previously lawful.82 However,
nonconforming uses can be terminated through amortization, which prohibits a
nonconforming land use after a reasonable period of time.83

75. See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 63, at 994 (discussing that courts use the Penn Central factors
when a regulation does not completely eliminate the economic value of the property in question); see also Wendie
L. Kellington, New Takes on Old Takes: A Takings Law Update, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS SCH. L., LAND USE LAW,
http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/takings_update.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (explaining that when a regulation affects less than the whole parcel of property in question,
which is a partial taking, courts use the Penn Central factors).
76. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
77. See Lynch, supra note 9, at 56 (describing the complexity of takings law cases).
78. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (establishing that zoning laws
are valid unless they are “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relationship to the public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare”); see also SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 63, at 818 (explaining
that governments avoid triggering unconstitutional takings litigation by using zoning law and nonconforming use
to terminate unwanted land uses).
79. See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 63, at 817 (describing that zoning law divides land and
establishes permissible land uses).
80. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 380 (serving as an example that local governments frequently zone
land into separate residential and commercial areas).
81. See Trip Assocs., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 898 A.2d 449, 455 (Md. 2006) (“[A]
‘nonconforming use’ is defined as ‘any lawfully existing use of a structure or of land that does not conform to the
applicable use regulations of the district in which it is located.’”).
82. See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 63, at 818, 823–24 (explaining that nonconforming uses are
protected land uses, unless the use is terminated through amortization, abandonment, destruction of the building
that is housing the use, if the use is a nuisance, and eminent domain).
83. See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 63, at 824 (discussing that amortization generally terminates
a nonconforming land use after a reasonable period of time).
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When zoning amendments outlaw projects that are under construction, but not
yet completed, the critical question is whether the landowner acquired vested
rights.84 If an operator establishes vested rights, then the courts permit the project
to continue as a nonconforming use.85 A property owner establishes vested rights
by demonstrating he: (1) acquired permits; (2) spent funds in reliance on those
permits; and (3) performed actual work on the project. 86 Local governments can
terminate projects with vested rights through amortization.87
III. AB 345
AB 345 would have directed CalGEM to adopt regulations that would
establish a minimum setback distance between oil and gas activities and sensitive
receptors.88 However, AB 345 did not define what “oil and gas extraction
activities” would be affected by setback distances. 89 AB 345 defined sensitive
receptors to include homes, schools, hospitals, day care centers, playgrounds, and
other locations determined by the district or state board. 90 AB 345 required buffer
zone regulations to rely on health, scientific, and other data.91 In addition, AB 345
would not preempt state and local authorities from adopting additional
requirements that protect public health and safety for communities living near
production sites.92
AB 345 would have established an environmental justice and grant-based
reimbursement program to increase engagement with community groups in the
rulemaking process.93 Environmental justice aims to promote the equitable and
meaningful involvement of all people in the development and enforcement of
environmental laws.94 AB 345 sought to enhance participation of communities

84. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 32 (determining whether the landowner has vested rights is
essential for incomplete oil and gas projects).
85. See SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 63, at 824 (explaining that if a landowner proves they have
vested rights in a project, the project is protected as a nonconforming use).
86. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com., 17 Cal. 3d 785, 791 (Cal. 1976);
ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 31.
87. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 32 (describing that amortization can terminate vested rights).
88. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
89. Id.
90. Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42705.5(a) (West 2020).
91. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
92.
Id.;
see
Preemption,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption (last visited Aug. 8, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (explaining that preemption means that the laws of a higher authority will void the laws of a lower
authority if they conflict).
93. See AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted)
(“The Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency [which oversees the DOC and CalGEM] shall create an
environmental justice program within the Natural Resources Agency to identify and address any gaps in existing
programs, policies, or activities that may impede the achievement of environmental justice.”).
94. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65040.12 (West 2020).
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impacted by oil and gas production in the regulatory process. 95
IV. ANALYSIS
AB 345 was necessary to combat the public health crisis that is endangering
poor communities of color living in close proximity to oil and gas wells. 96 These
communities are at a higher risk for a number of symptoms and diseases, including
increased asthma attacks, cancer, high-risk pregnancies, and COVID-19
infections.97 The state government must direct its agencies to not cater to oil and
gas interests at the cost of people’s health and safety. 98
Section A asserts that continuing to allow oil and gas wells near communities
of color perpetuates systemic racism. 99 Section B explains the hydraulic fracking
process and how oil and gas production causes bad health outcomes. 100 Section C
argues that AB 345’s setback distance regulations would likely not have resulted
in a constitutional taking and proposes solutions that would have avoided takings
litigation.101 Section D discusses how AB 345 would have standardized setback
laws and improved protections for people’s health and safety. 102 Section E suggests
California should have adopted a 2,500 foot buffer zone and defined sensitive
receptors broadly through AB 345.103 Section F explores how AB 345 would have
fiscally impacted oil and gas workers and proposes solutions for workers that
would have been displaced.104 Section G discusses how California can pass setback
laws through California’s rulemaking process. 105

95. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
96. Compare id. (creating setback distances between oil and gas wells and communities would protect
public health), with SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4 (showing communities of color are
more likely to live near oil and gas operations).
97. See LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, supra note 8, at 12 (highlighting that residents living near oil and gas
wells also report higher rates of premature births, rashes, asthma attacks, and headaches); Joseph Luiz, Study:
Counties With High Air Pollution Have Increased Death Risk for COVID-19, KGET (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.kget.com/national-news/study-higher-air-pollution-rates-up-death-risk-for-coronavirus-patients/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting a study that found counties with long-term air
pollution had a 15% increase in COVID-19 death rate).
98. See Justin Hedemark, Taming the West: Senate Bill 4 and California’s Struggle to Regulate Fracking,
8 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 128 (2015) (asserting DOGGR’s responsibility to maximize hydrocarbon
recovery and allowing fracking while also protecting “life, health, property, and natural resources” created
seemingly contradictory and competing interests).
99. Infra Section IV.A.
100. Infra Section IV.B.
101. Infra Section IV.C.
102. Infra Section IV.D.
103. Infra Section IV.E.
104. Infra Section IV.F.
105. Infra Section IV.G.
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A. Linking the Placement of Oil and Gas Wells, Public Health, and
Environmental Racism
AB 345 would have mitigated the impact oil and gas production near minority
communities by requiring setback distances.106 In California’s most polluted
regions, 1.8 million people live within one mile of an oil or gas well. 107 Ninetytwo percent of those 1.8 million are people of color. 108 Continuing to allow oil and
gas production near homes without restrictions is environmental racism.109 Oil and
gas companies specifically target minority populations to build production
facilities because those communities are less likely to successfully resist. 110
Minority communities frequently have fewer financial resources to participate in
the political process and fight the placement of production sites. 111 They are also
unable to competitively lobby politicians and contribute to election campaigns. 112
When the City of Arvin was considering its 300-foot setback distance, the
California Independent Petroleum Association contributed $20,000 to pro-oil and
pro-gas politicians in the city’s councilmember race. 113 Historically, a typical wellfunded campaign in Arvin only cost $2,000.114 Instead of communities fighting a
Goliathan battle against operators, AB 345 would have protected communities by
mandating statewide buffer zones that would level the political playing field. 115

106. Compare AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not
enacted) (creating setback distances would protect the public health of communities near oil and gas activity),
with SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4 (indicating that people of color are more likely to live
near oil and gas operations).
107. SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4.
108. Id.
109. See Torres, supra note 13 (“[W]hen we label an environmental practice as an example of
environmental racism we are saying that the predictable distributional impact of that decision contributes to the
structure of racial subordination and domination that has similarly marked many of our public policies in this
country.”).
110. See WITHGOTT & LAPOSATA, supra note 12, at 138 (explaining low-income and minority
communities have less access to information, political power, and financial resources to prevent environmental
degradation in their communities).
111. See id. at 138 (providing an example showing the link between race and environmental degradation
through North Carolina’s decision to place a toxic waste dump in Warren County, a community with the highest
percentage of African Americans in North Carolina).
112. See Lobbying Activity Western States Petroleum Association, CAL. SECRETARY ST. CAL-ACCESS,
http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Lobbying/Employers/Detail.aspx?id=1147195&view=activity&session=2019 (last
visited Aug. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting Western States Petroleum
Association, an oil and gas trade group, spent approximately $8.8 million in 2019).
113. Gabriel Thompson, Meet the Millennial Mayor Who Took on Big Oil—and Won, NATION (July 12,
2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/arvin-california-oil-drilling-resistance/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
114. Id.
115. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted); see
Lynch, supra note 9, 42 (asserting that the oil and gas industry fights fracking regulation by threatening
governments with lawsuits).
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B. Allowing Oil and Gas Wells Near Communities of Color is a Public Health
Crisis
Enacting AB 345 and establishing setback distances was critical to avert the
public health crisis happening in communities living near oil and gas wells. 116 Oil
and gas activity contaminates the air and water in nearby communities.117
Subsection 1 explains how hydraulic fracking allowed operators to encroach upon
the areas where people live.118 Subsection 2 describes how oil and gas activity
contaminate the air and water and how that impacts people’s health. 119 Subsection
3 argues why enhanced public participation is critical when governments are
developing environmental regulations.120
1. The Hydraulic Fracking Process
Oil and gas operators extract from wells near communities using hydraulic
fracking, which allows access to fossil fuel reserves that were previously
inaccessible.121 In the United States, nearly all oil and natural gas that is easy to
extract has already been discovered and removed.122 As a result, the oil and gas
industry developed fracking to allow operators to drill deeper into hard rock
formations and at odd-angles underground.123
When operators drill into the earth vertically, the drill is then angled
horizontally once a hard shale formation is reached. 124 Afterwards, millions of
gallons of water containing a mixture of toxic chemicals are pumped into the
well.125 Produced wastewater flows back up to the surface along with the oil and
natural gas, which operators then process. 126 Fracking allows the oil and gas
industry to extract from large-scale industrial facilities in densely populated urban

116. See LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, supra note 8, at 12 (“Californians living near active oil and gas wells
report suffering from symptoms such as nosebleeds, headaches, and worsened asthma.”).
117. Id.
118. Infra Subsection IV.B.1.
119. Infra Subsection IV.B.2.
120. Infra Subsection IV.B.3.
121. See WITHGOTT & LAPOSATA, supra note 12, at 160 (explaining that hydraulic fracking is also known
as “hydrofracking” or just “fracking”).
122. See id. at 159.
123. See id. at 160 (specifying that hydraulic fracking allowed operators to access the massive Marcellus
Shale formation that underlies Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia).
124. See id.
125. Hydraulic Fracturing and its Impact on Water Resources, WATER FOOTPRINT CALCULATOR (Oct.
13, 2018), https://www.watercalculator.org/footprint/fracking-water/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (highlighting in studies of six basins, the median water use for shale-gas ranged from 390,000 to
6.27 million gallons per well, while for shale-oil median water use ranged from 70,000 to 2 million gallons of
water per well).
126. See WITHGOTT & LAPOSATA, supra note 12, at 160.
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and suburban areas.127
2. Oil and Gas Production Poisons the Air and Water
Oil and gas activity pollutes the air around communities near fossil fuel
production.128 The Los Angeles County Department of Public Health reported that
over 300 chemicals used in oil and gas hydraulic use drilling fluids are associated
with health issues ranging from respiratory problems to cancer. 129 Oil and gas
activity releases air contaminants through wells, pipelines, the operation of
equipment, and accidental releases.130 Communities of color living in close
proximity to oil and gas wells are especially harmed because many in those same
regions already have the worst air quality in the nation.131 For example, Arvin, a
predominantly Hispanic and low-income community, is in the ninety-eighth
percentile for ground level ozone concentrations. 132
By adopting AB 345, California would have protected communities near oil
and gas development by preserving valuable water supplies. 133 Hydraulic
fracking’s toxic produced wastewater is primarily placed in disposal wells. 134
However, faulty disposal wells act as conduits for produced wastewater that
contaminate the state’s water supplies. 135 Oil and gas activity also pollute water

127. See Lynch, supra note 9, at 42 (indicating that operators increasingly encroach upon densely
populated areas to extract oil and gas).
128. See LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, supra note 8, at 12 (stressing that oil and gas production releases
harmful cancer-causing chemicals, such as benzene, formaldehyde, and cadmium).
129. KATHERINE BUTLER ET AL., L.A. CTY. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS
OF
OIL AND GAS FACILITIES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 7 (2018), available at
http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/eh/docs/PH_OilGasFacilitiesPHSafetyRisks.pdf (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review).
130. Id.
131. See SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4 (“These communities, highly vulnerable to
additional pollution from oil and gas development, consist primarily of Latinos/Hispanics (69 percent), African
Americans (10 percent), and Asian Americans (11 percent).”).
132.
See
generally
QuickFacts
Arvin City, California,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/chart/arvincitycalifornia/RHI725219#RHI725219 (last visited Aug. 9,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating that 94.1% of Arvin residents identify
as Hispanic or Latino); Ozone Results from Calenviroscreen 3.0, CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD
ASSESSMENT,
https://oehha.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=5eb3c82ae44b43c680bc32564032812d (enter
“Arvin, CA, USA” in the search box) (last visited Aug. 9, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (showing Arvin is in the ninety-eighth percentile for ozone concentrations).
133. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted); see
LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, supra note 8, at 18 (explaining that oil and gas production are a serious threat to
California’s water supplies because of the toxic chemicals used in the production process that can contaminate
surface and groundwater).
134. See LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, supra note 8, at 18 (discussing that California’s disposal wells
sometimes inject toxic wastewater into protected aquifers).
135.
Getting
Up
to
Speed,
Ground
Water
Contamination,
EPA
C7,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/mgwc-gwc1.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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through transportation spills and leaks. 136 Oil and gas production disproportionally
threatens the water resources of minority communities living near facilities. 137
Hydraulic fracking’s water-intensive process often occurs in minority
communities, where water is also the most scarce. 138 AB 345’s minimum setback
distance would have protected communities against the negative health impacts of
air and water pollution caused by oil and gas activity.139
3. The Importance of AB 345’s Enhanced Public Participation Measures
AB 345 sought to establish an environmental justice and grant-based program
to enhance participation.140 Typically, people living near oil and gas wells are
excluded from the regulatory process.141 A frequent barrier for communities of
color resisting the placement of oil and gas production is the lack of information
on how production facilities impact their health. 142 Although AB 345 would not
have immediately remedied the obstacles communities face in combatting oil and
gas development, AB 345 would have been a step forward. 143
C. AB 345 is Not Likely an Unconstitutional Taking
The oil and gas industry argued that AB 345’s setback distances would cause
unconstitutional regulatory takings because setbacks would interfere with their
right to profit from their property.144 A critical issue on whether AB 345’s setback
distances would have resulted in unconstitutional takings would likely depend on

136. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2
(2016), available at https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid=332990 (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (finding that fracking can pollute drinking water during transportation spills
and when hydraulic fracturing fluids are injected into wells with inadequate mechanical integrity).
137. See SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4, 6 (indicating oil and gas production
pollutes water sources, which disproportionally impacts communities of color).
138. See LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, supra note 8, at 18 n.14 (“[F]inding 98 percent of fracking occurs in
areas of high or extreme water stress.”).
139. Compare AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not
enacted) (adopting setback distances would mitigate air and water pollution caused by oil and gas extraction),
with SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4, 6 (explaining that oil and gas pollution
disproportionally impacts people of color, who are more likely to live near oil and gas activity).
140. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
141. See WITHGOTT & LAPOSATA, supra note 12, at 138 (explaining that minority communities are
exposed to a greater share of environmental pollution because they often have less access to information on
environmental health risks).
142. See id. at 138.
143. See AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted)
(adopting setback distances would help protect the health of communities living near oil and gas activity).
144. See Lynch, supra note 9, at 42 (explaining that the oil and gas industry threaten to file takings claims
to prevent oil and gas setback regulations).
THE
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the definition of “oil and gas activities.”145 However, the oil and gas industry’s
takings claims would not likely succeed due to the rarity of takings and the
California government’s overriding interest in protecting public health. 146
Subsection 1 discusses why setback distances would likely not result in total
takings.147 Subsection 2 argues that buffer zones would not likely cause partial
takings.148 Subsection 3 proposes using zoning and nonconforming use law to
phase out oil and gas wells within buffer zones. 149
1. The Lucas Test and AB 345
Under the Lucas test, AB 345 would not likely have caused unconstitutional
regulatory total takings because courts generally require a near total elimination of
a property’s value.150 A court would probably not conclude that AB 345 completely
deprives an operator’s property value because operators could still profit from
wells outside buffer zones, but are still within the property parcel. 151 Even if a
setback distance completely prohibited surface production on an operator’s
property, operators would likely still retain their property’s value through mineral
rights.152
If the court concluded that a setback resulted in total deprivation of a
property’s value, the state would still be able to raise a successful background
principles defense.153 In Lucas, the Court provides the example that restricting a
145. See Infra Subsection IV.C1–C3 (discussing the potential constitutional problems with AB 345).
146. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 31 (asserting that governments can argue that setback
distances are not takings because government can utilize their police power to enact laws that protect public
health).
147. Infra Subsection IV.C.1.
148. Infra Subsection IV.C.2.
149. Infra Subsection IV.C.3.
150. ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 31.
151. Compare Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 616, 630–31 (2001) (determining that even a 94% reduction
in a landowner’s property value due to wetland protection law did not completely deprive the property of its value
and therefore, did not constitute a total regulatory taking under Lucas), with AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess.
(Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted) (indicating that AB 345 would only regulate oil and
gas activities within buffer zones).
152. See What is Surface Rights?, L. DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/surface-rights/ (last visited
Aug. 30, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Rights of a landowner to the exterior or
upper section of land.”); What is Mineral Rights?, L. DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/mineral-rights/
(last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Rights to search for and
remove minerals from the land belonging to the owner . . . .”); Eric Schlabs, Legal Challenges to Fracking
Regulation, REG. REV. (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.theregreview.org/2015/08/18/schlabs-fracking-regulation/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) ( “[A] fracking company will have a difficult time defining
the scope of its property so narrowly that a ban renders the property valueless. Even if state law allows the mineral
estate to be considered separately from the surface property . . . a total takings claim cannot proceed if the mineral
estate in question has any remaining value or might one day produce oil and gas without fracking.”).
153. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (establishing that the background
principles of property and nuisance law defense defeats a total takings claim if a landowner’s current use of the
land is already unlawful); See Lynch, supra note 9, at 63 (“[I]f the government is able to prove . . . a background
principle could impose the same limit as the regulation” then the government does not need to pay just
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power plant found on a fault line would not be a taking because of the background
principles defense.154 AB 345 advocates could have argued that oil and gas wells
pose dangers similar to nuclear plants and are therefore a nuisance. 155 Similar to
nuclear power plants, oil and gas are important energy sources; however, they pose
serious public health and safety concerns, especially when located near
communities.156 AB 345’s setback distance would not likely satisfy the very rare
Lucas requirement that a regulation completely deprive a property of its value.157
2. The Penn Central Test and AB 345
AB 345 would also not likely cause a partial taking under the Penn Central
balancing factors. 158 The first factor examines the economic impact of the
regulation.159 Courts could have distinguished old and new wells within buffer
zones to determine AB 345’s economic impact. 160 The economic impact on older
wells would be less because operators have already extracted fossil fuel and
profited from those wells. 161 Therefore, the first Penn Central factor could have
weighed in favor for AB 345’s advocates or opponents depending on the number
of old and new wells within AB 345’s setback distance. 162
Under the second Penn Central factor, a court would examine whether AB
345’s setback distances interfered with a landowner’s reasonable investment-

compensation to the landowner).
154. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (finding that regulatory action to limit a nuclear power plant found on an
earthquake fault line, even if the owner made improvements, is not a taking due to background principles of
property and nuisance law).
155. Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (concluding that regulating a nuclear power plant on a fault line
was not a taking because of background principles defense), and Todd D. Brody, Examining the Nuisance
Exception to the Takings Clause: Is There Life for Environmental Regulations After Lucas, 4 Fordham Envtl. L.
Rev. 287, 304 (2011) (asserting the nuclear power plant in Lucas was not a taking because the plant was a
nuisance), with BUTLER ET AL., supra note 128 (showing evidence that over 300 chemicals used in oil and gas
extraction are associated with health issues ranging from respiratory problems to cancer, which AB 345 advocates
could argue are also a nuisance).
156. See LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, supra note 8, at 12 (“California’s oil and gas production releases
pollutants to the air, water, and soil that endanger surrounding communities.”).
157. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7,
2020, but not enacted).
158. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (listing the Penn Central
factors: (1) the economic impact of the regulation, (2) the regulation’s interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action).
159. Id.
160. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 32 (comparing older and newer wells and asserting older
wells, some of which are decades old, are less valuable because operators have already extracted oil and gas).
161. Id.
162. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (concluding that the court considers the economic
impact of a regulation when assessing a takings claim), with ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 32 (asserting that
the number of old and new wells within a property parcel could impact whether an oil or gas operator’s takings
claim is successful).
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backed expectations.163 Highly regulated industries should expect future
regulation.164 Since oil and gas extraction is a highly regulated industry, operators
should reasonably expect regulations, such as AB 345, that will restrict their
activity.165 In addition, due to California’s declining oil production and the
looming clean-up costs of abandoned wells, courts would likely determine AB
345’s impact on investment-backed expectations to be minimal.166 Operators’
investments are at risk because of clean-up costs for approximately 35,000
abandoned wells across the state. 167 Thus, a court would likely conclude that AB
345’s impact on investment-backed expectations would likely be marginal in
comparison to operators’ more pressing financial concerns.168
The third Penn Central factor examines the character of the government action
and whether it arose from a “physical invasion.”169 The character of AB 345 was
to prevent harm to communities living near oil and gas wells. 170 In addition,
governments have broad discretion under their police power authority to enact laws
that protect public health.171 AB 345’s setback distances would likely fall firmly
within California’s police power to protect public health.172 Therefore, the third
163. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
164. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (showing that the court examines a property
owner’s investment-backed expectations to determine if a regulation caused a partial taking) and Appolo Fuels,
Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (indicating that the court will consider in particular
three factors to determine a party's reasonable expectations: (1) whether the plaintiff operated in a “highly
regulated industry,” (2) whether the plaintiff was aware of the problem that spawned the regulation at the time it
purchased the allegedly taken property, and (3) whether the plaintiff could have reasonably anticipated the
possibility of such regulation in light of the regulatory environment at the time of purchase.”), with District
Intown Props., Ltd. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Businesses that operate in an
industry with a history of regulation have no reasonable expectation that regulation will not be strengthened to
achieve established legislative ends.”).
165. Compare E. Allison & B. Mandler, U.S. Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations, AM. GEOSCIENCES
INST., https://www.americangeosciences.org/geoscience-currents/us-regulation-oil-and-gas-operations (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (last updated June 1, 2018) (showing that the oil and gas industry
has been regulated for over 100 years in some form by federal, state, and local governments), with AB 345, 2020
Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted) (serving as an example of a
regulation that the oil and gas industry should reasonably expect).
166. Id.; see LAST CHANCE ALLIANCE, supra note 8, at 20 fig.1 (showing that oil production between 1985
and 2017 declined by 56%); Olalde & Menezes, supra note 1 (emphasizing that California has approximately
35,000 abandoned wells costing on average between $40,000 and $152,000 to clean up).
167. See Olalde & Menezes, supra note 1 (describing that thousands of oil business historically went out
of business due to lack of funds for well clean-up costs).
168. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (indicating that the courts consider a property
owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations), with Olalde & Menezes, supra note 1 (describing that
thousands of oil business historically went out of business due to lack of funds for well clean-up costs; suggesting
operators’ investment expectations are more likely to suffer from looming clean-up costs than setback distances).
169. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
170. See AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted)
(indicating AB 345 sought to protect public health by guiding CalGEM to adopt setback distances).
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also CAL. CONST. art.
XI, § 7 (“A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. X; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.

405

2021 / California Oil and Gas Production Near Communities of Color is a Public
Health Crisis
Penn Central factor would weigh heavily against a finding for a partial taking.173
The first Penn Central factor may favor oil and gas operators in finding a
partial taking because AB 345 could impact the value of wells within setbacks. 174
However, due to the second and third Penn Central factors, a court would likely
conclude that AB 345 would not cause a partial taking. 175 Under the second Penn
Central factor, highly regulated industries, such as the oil and gas industry, should
expect future regulations.176 In addition, AB 345’s impact on an operator’s
reasonable investment-backed expectations would likely be minimal in
comparison to the oil and gas industry’s other financial obligations.177 For the third
Penn Central factor, AB 345 would promote public health, an important public
interest.178
3. Avoiding Unconstitutional Takings: Phasing Oil and Gas Wells as a
Nonconforming Land Use
To avoid unconstitutional takings litigation triggered by AB 345, governments
can phase-out oil and gas production as a nonconforming land use. 179 A regulation
can terminate a project with vested rights without triggering a taking if the
government provides a reasonable amortization phase-out period to recover

173. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
174. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (showing that the court considers the economic
impact of a regulation when assessing a partial takings claim), with ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 32 (arguing
that the number of old and new wells within a property parcel could impact whether an oil or gas operator’s
takings claim succeeds).
175. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (indicating that the court considers a property
owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of the government action to determine
whether a regulation caused a partial taking), and District Intown Props., Ltd., 198 F.3d 874, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(showing that highly regulated industries should expect future regulation), with Olalde & Menezes, supra note 1
(reporting that oil and gas operators are at risk of bankruptcy due to well clean-up costs; suggesting that operators’
investment expectations are more likely to suffer from clean-up costs rather than setback distance regulations),
and AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted) (serving as
an example of a regulation that the oil and gas industry, a highly regulated field, should reasonably expect).
176. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (indicating that the courts assess a property owner’s
reasonable investment-backed expectations to determine whether a government regulation caused an
unconstitutional partial taking), and District Intown Props., Ltd., 198 F.3d 874, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(demonstrating that highly regulated industries should expect future regulation), with E. Allison & B. Mandler,
supra note 165 (explaining that the oil and gas industry has been regulated for over 100 years in some form by
federal, state, and local governments), with AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on
Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted) (serving as an example of a regulation that the oil and gas operators should
reasonably expect).
177. Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (showing that the courts examine a property
owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations to assess whether a government regulation caused a partial
taking), and Olalde & Menezes, supra note 1 (reporting that California oil and gas operators are threatened by
looming clean-up costs), with AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020,
but not enacted) (suggesting AB 345’setback distances would likely be a ).
178. Infra Subsection IV.C.2.
179. ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 32.
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investment costs. 180 Newer wells might take years to phase-out to recover a
landowner’s investment. 181 However, older wells that have fully recovered their
initial investment costs might not even be protected as a nonconforming land
use.182 Environmental activists recommend a five-year amortization period for oil
and gas wells.183 Therefore, to prevent takings lawsuits prompted by AB 345,
California can still phase-out oil and gas setback distances through amortization.184
D. Eliminating the Patchwork of Local Setback Distance Laws
AB 345 would have standardized setback laws and provided a better safeguard
for the public health of minority communities living near oil and gas wells. 185 The
current patchwork of buffer zone laws leaves many vulnerable communities living
near production sites at risk.186 Most local governments near oil and gas wells lack
the political strength to adopt setback distance laws. 187 Buffer zone laws already
adopted by some cities and counties are insufficient because the setback distances
in those laws are too short to adequately protect public health.188 With AB 345, the
issue of adopting a buffer zone law would have no longer been a question—it
would have been mandatory statewide. 189
Further, the various local setback ordinances produce jurisdictional conflict
between cities and counties.190 For example, the City of Arvin clashed with Kern
County about whether the county’s oil permitting laws superseded the city’s 300foot buffer zone.191 Jose Gurrola, the Mayor of Arvin, stated that the city’s 300foot setback distance applies within the city’s boundaries. 192 However, in the
unincorporated areas surrounding Arvin, Kern County’s ordinances are
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 32 n.209.
184. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted);
ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 32.
185. Compare AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not
enacted) (adopting setback distances would protect the public health of communities living close to oil and gas
activity), with SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4 (showing evidence that minority
communities are more likely to live near oil and gas operations).
186. See supra Section.II.C (discussing setback distances in California cities that range from 200-750 feet).
187. See WITHGOTT & LAPOSATA, supra note 12, at 138 (explaining that a barrier for minority
communities in adopting environmental laws is the discrepancy in influence over politicians in comparison the
oil and gas industry).
188. Compare LONG ET AL., supra note 32, at 45 (recommending an approximately 2,500 setback distance),
with ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 30 (listing several cities that already adopted setback distances, including
Arvin, Carson, Huntington Beach, Long Beach, and Signal Hill, that range from 200 feet to 750 feet).
189. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
190. See Gurrola Interview, supra note 4 (explaining Kern County challenged Arvin’s setback distance
and claiming Kern’s laws preempt Arvin’s).
191. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted);
Gurrola Interview, supra note 4.
192. Gurrola Interview, supra note 4.
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controlling.193AB 345’s standardization of buffer zones would have provided more
protection for the public safety of minority communities living near production
than the current patchwork of local setback ordinances. 194
AB 345 would have also been a stronger safeguard for public health because
it used agencies to enforce its setback distances. 195 AB 345 would have utilized a
powerful agency framework to protect public health. 196 The state government has
the necessary financial resources to effectively create buffer zone regulations and
enforce them.197 California could have modeled its buffer zones laws after
Colorado, a state that utilizes an agency-led approach to setback distance laws. 198
E. California Should Adopt a Buffer Zone of at least 2,500 Feet and Define
“Sensitive Receptors” Broadly
AB 345 was an opportunity for the state to mandate a 2,500-foot buffer zone
and define “sensitive receptors” broadly to protect minority communities living
near production facilities. 199 AB 345’s language required that setback distances be
based on “health, scientific, and other data.”200 Studies found that the most
significant exposure to toxic air contaminants occur within 2,500 feet from oil and
gas production.201 Setting the buffer zone at 2,500 feet would not have stopped air
and water pollution; however, the distance would have mitigated negative health
outcomes.202
The language of AB 345 left open the option for state agencies to further refine
the definition of sensitive receptors. 203 California’s state agencies could have
looked towards the local statutes of cities and counties and their setback distances

193. Id.
194. Compare AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not
enacted (creating a statewide and uniform setback distance would help the public health of communities living
near oil and gas facilities), with SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 4 (showing evidence that
people of color are more likely to live close to oil and gas activity and therefore, suffer from oil and gas pollution).
195. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
196. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted).
197. Id.
198. See ELKIND & LAMM, supra note 20, at 46 (describing Colorado’s setback laws).
199. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted); see
LONG ET AL., supra note 32, at 45 (reporting that people experience the most exposure to air contaminants within
2,500 feet of an oil and gas well; therefore, the report recommends governments adopt 2,500-foot setback laws).
200. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted);
LONG ET AL., supra note 32, at 45.
201. LONG ET AL., supra note 32, at 45.
202. See id. (explaining setback distances have been adopted to reduce exposure to pollution caused by oil
and gas production).
203. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted); see
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42705.5(a) (West 2020) (listing that sensitive receptors include schools,
hospitals, day care centers, and other locations that the district or state board determine).
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ordinances as examples.204 The City of Signal Hill and the counties of Kern and
Ventura could serve as an example.205 They define sensitive receptors to broadly
include any building used for public gathering.206 Adopting a 2,500-foot setback
distance would have strengthened current local city and county buffer zones, none
of which approach the necessary distance to adequately protect public health. 207
F. AB 345 and Employment in the Oil and Gas Industry
In the debate over AB 345, oil and gas workers were frequently pitted against
environmental activists. 208 However, the fight to protect public health for
communities near production facilities was a fight for these workers’ lives. 209 Oil
and gas workers are not separate from the community.210 AB 345 would have
protected the neighborhoods where workers live, the schools their children attend,
and the hospitals they go to when they are sick.211
Oil and gas workers had valid concerns about AB 345’s impact on their
livelihood; however, setbacks laws would not automatically equate to job loss.212
Ingrid Brostrom, an environmental advocate, explained that oil and gas dependent
regions need to diversify their economies. 213 She suggested investing in
electrification that capitalizes on the Central Valley’s importance as a
transportation center. 214 She also recommended developing jobs that rehabilitate

204. See supra Section.II.C (describing setback distances in California that vary from 200-750 feet).
205. See SIGNAL HILL, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 16.16 (1990) (indicating Signal Hill already adopted
setback distances); KERN COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE tit. 19, ch. 19.98 (2015) (showing Kern County
already has setback distance laws); VENTURA COUNTY, CAL. ORDINANCE CODE div. 8, ch. 1 (1985)
(demonstrating Ventura County already passed setback distance laws).
206. SIGNAL HILL, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 16.16 (1990); KERN COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE tit.
19, ch. 19.98 (2015); VENTURA COUNTY, CAL. ORDINANCE CODE div. 8, ch. 1 (1985).
207. See supra Section.II.C (showing that setback distances in California vary from 200-750 feet).
208. See CalGEM Public Health Virtual Meeting (June 2, 2020) (transcript available at
https://www.conservation.ca.gov/calgem/Documents/publichealth/June%202%20CalGEM%20Public%20Health%20Virtual%20Meeting%20Transcript.pdf) [hereinafter
CalGEM Public Health Virtual Meeting] (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing unionrepresented oil and gas workers expressing their opposition to AB 345 because of their concerns that AB 345 will
take away their jobs).
209. Id.
210. See id. (demonstrating that oil and gas workers are not separate from the communities impacted by
oil and gas activity).
211. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Jan 27, 2019, but not enacted); see
CalGEM Public Health Virtual Meeting, supra note 204 (documenting people participating and explaining the
impacts oil and gas activity has on their communities).
212. See Telephone Interview with Ingrid Brostrom, Assistant Director for the Center on Race, Poverty &
the Environment (June 5, 2020) [hereinafter Brostrom Interview] (notes on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (suggesting that the government should intervene to create new work opportunities to replace oil
and gas jobs).
213. See id. (“We’re getting to a point where we have to change . . . the cycle of downturns decimates the
whole economy.”).
214. Id.
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the environment, such as soil and well remediation jobs.215 Thus, AB 345’s setback
distances did not mean that oil and gas workers would not have jobs.216
G. Reviving Setback Distances Through CalGEM
Although AB 345 did not pass, CalGEM can still adopt setback distance
regulations through the rulemaking process. 217 Under California’s APA, any
person can petition CalGEM to consider buffer zones with a 2,500-foot setback
distance.218 Setback regulations fall under CalGEM’s scope of authority to
promote public health and the environment. 219 Public health and environmental
advocates pushed for AB 345 because it would have forced CalGEM to adopt
setback regulations. 220 However, with AB 345’s demise, CalGEM should listen to
communities living near oil and gas wells and to their demands for better setback
distances from production sites.221
V. CONCLUSION
California’s current approach to protect the health and safety of families living
near oil and gas production—particularly vulnerable communities of color—is
inadequate.222 As hydraulic fracking allows oil and gas activity closer to people’s
homes, California must take aggressive action to protect its residents. 223 Studies
demonstrate that proximity to oil and gas production is associated with serious
health issues.224 Despite threats of unconstitutional regulatory takings claims, AB
345 would not have likely resulted in takings under either the Lucas or the Penn
Central test.225 AB 345 would have used California’s powerful agency framework

215. Id.
216. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Jan 27, 2019, but not enacted);
Brostrom Interview, supra note 208.
217. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 11340–11361 (West 2020).
218. Id. § 11340.6.
219. Id. § 11342.1.
220. See AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Jan 27, 2019, but not enacted)
(indicating in the language of the proposed bill that CalGEM would be required to adopt setback distance
regulations).
221. See CalGEM Public Health Virtual Meeting, supra note 204 (showing community members
demanding California to adopt statewide setback distances).
222. See SREBOTNJAK & ROTKIN-ELLMAN, supra note 10, at 9 (2014) (indicating that approximately 5.4
million people live within a mile of one or more oil and gas wells, which is roughly to 1 in 5 African Americans,
1 in 6 Hispanic/Latinos, 1 in 7 Asians, and 1 in 9 Whites).
223. See Lynch, supra note 9, at 42 (indicating that hydraulic fracking increasingly allows operators to
extract oil and gas in populated urban and suburban areas).
224. See LONG ET AL., supra note 32, at 431 (“The . . . closer a population is to active oil and gas
development, the more elevated the exposure, primarily to air pollutants but also to water pollutants . . .”).
225. See supra Section IV.C (asserting setback laws will not result in total or partial takings).
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to create uniformity across current setback distances. 226 Also, AB 345 did not
equate to job loss.227 With specific planning and investment, California could move
towards a future that provides job alternatives to the oil and gas industry.228
Although AB 345 would have helped California take a step forward in addressing
racism and protecting public health, the state can still move forward by adopting a
setback distance through rulemaking.229

226. See supra Section IV.D (arguing AB 345 standardizes California’s current patchwork of local setback
distances).
227. Brostrom Interview, supra note 208.
228. Id.
229. AB 345, 2020 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on Aug. 7, 2020, but not enacted);
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 11340–11361 (West 2020).
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